Future healthcare systems, smart homes, and similar will involve a large number of smart inter-connected wireless devices (such as wireless sensor nodes). One of the major challenges to securing these systems presents loading initial cryptographic credentials into a relatively large number of wireless devices. Furthermore, many of these technologies involve low-cost and highly interface constrained devices (lacking usual wired interfaces, displays, keypads, and alike).
INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a new ubiquitouscomputing paradigm that seeks to enhance the traditional Internet by creating intelligent interconnections of diverse objects in the physical world. This network generally encompasses a large number of wireless devices that lack traditional user interfaces (like keyboards, keypads, displays), and often have limited computing and energy resources (e.g., tiny wireless sensor devices). IoT applications range from Smart Homes, e/m-healthcare systems, Smart Cities, Intelligent Transport Systems, etc.
In a typical m-healthcare scenario, a user (being a nurse, a physician or a patient) would like to setup an ad of communicating with each other and with personal gadgets such as smartphones, tablets, smart TVs, etc., over short range wireless technologies such as Bluetooth and WiFi. Moreover, the sensing devices will be able to exchange data with remote web/cloud servers either directly, using for example GSM/UMTS technology, or indirectly using different WiFi proxies (home access points, smartphone-based hotspots, etc.). Of course, prior to any communication taking place, the user would like to take appropriate steps towards ensuring privacy and integrity of information of personal nature (e.g., personal data readings). However, the problem of bootstrapping a secure communication between such wireless devices (a.k.a. -secure network bootstrapping/initialization) presents a great challenge [1, 2] , especially for devices, such as iBeacons [3, 4] or LIFX smart bulbs [5] , that lack traditional rich user interfaces (keyboards, keypads and displays). Ideally, establishing secure associations between interface limited devices and smartphones/tablets, between interface limited devices and remote cloud servers, and between the inteface limited devices themselves, should be very easy and natural for the user to carry out, without requiring him/her to go through complex and error prone device configuration procedures (involving extra cables, selecting and typing passwords in each and every network device, reading long instruction manuals). In this work, we focus specifically on the problem of establishing initial security associations between a potentially larger group of interface constrained wireless devices that do not share any authentic information, like secret passwords, pins, keys, certificates or similar common knowledge, in advance. Our ultimate goal is to secure communication within the given group of devices, i.e., ensure that each group member can establish an authentic and private channel with any other group member. We refer to this problem as to secure network bootstrapping or secure network initialization. Although in this work we do not explicitly address the problem of securing communication outside the given group of wireless devices (e.g., communication between a group member and a remote server), the solutions we develop here for bootstrapping secure within-group communication can easily be adapted for this purpose.
Many existing proposals for secure network bootstrapping assume that the network nodes already share a secret key (preloaded at the manufacturing time) that can be used to bootstrap secure key agreement at later stages [6, 7, 8] . However, a recent weakness found in LIFX smart bulbs [5] shows that this approach comes with a great risk: the compromise of a single device (the preloaded shared secret key) can lead to the compromise of the whole network or even the whole line of devices. The case with LIFX smart bulbs only confirms the fact that users may not always trust the keys preloaded by the manufacturer. Some other solutions for secure network bootstrapping propose sending the keys in clear over an insecure wireless channel, assuming that the attacker will not be present during the key deployment [9] . Another line of work, including
Message-in-a-Bottle [10] and KALWEN [11] , rely on the availability of a specialized setup hardware (e.g., a Faraday cage) during the key deployment. While very secure, the need for specialized hardware makes the solution quite expensive and difficult to use. Some other well-established secure bootstrapping solutions are based on multichannel protocols [12] where communication between network devices takes place over two channels, an insecure high bandwidth radio channel and a special low bandwidth out-of-band (OoB) channel, such as visible light (a.k.a.
-visible light channel/communication (VLC)) or acoustic channel. The solutions presented in [13, 14, 15] are based on the multichannel approach that involve a camera and visible light communication. This approach scales very well with the number of devices in the network, but can still be somewhat involved for the end user who has to setup and position the camera. Perkovic et al. [16] and Li et. al. [17] also propose solutions which exploit an auxiliary OoB visible light channel, but require no additional specialized hardware apart from the network devices themselves. While completely eliminating the need for extra/specialized hardware, these solutions can be very demanding for an end user in some of their aspects (see Perkovic et al. [16] for more details). Similar solutions (e.g., GAnGs [18] and Groupthink [19] ) are developed for multi-user setting where each user has a personal device, secret key cryptography, and therefore it is suitable for highly CPU-constrained devices/nodes. LIRA has been initially proposed in [21] , and here we extend it in several important ways: we simplify and optimize the original LIRA protocol (by reducing the number of messages required for secure bootstrapping), we formally verify the security properties of LIRA protocol using Scyther tool † , and finally, we substantially extend the usability study related to LIRA from [21] . In LIRA protocol, a light source (LS) unit (a screen of a tablet, smartphone, laptop, etc.)
transmits secret keys over a protected visible light channel to a group of wireless devices ( Fig. 1 ). In the second phase of the protocol, one device takes the role of a group coordinator and runs a key verification process with the remaining group members over an insecure radio channel.
Light is easier to block and hide from an eavesdropping adversary than radio waves and that makes our approach easier and less cumbersome to secure than, e.g., Messagein-a-bottle [10] and KALWEN [11] . Moreover, since any source of light, e.g., a laptop, a smartphone, or a tablet screen, can be used to transmit the keys, many nodes can be programmed at the same time without the need for specialized hardware, increasing usability and overall speed. We implemented LIRA protocol on commercially available (interface constrained) wireless platforms and we show the performance and scalability of our system through extensive usability experiments with 48 users. The results of the study indicate that LIRA protocol is easy to use, it is robust to user errors and it achieves fast protocol execution times.
Although light signal is harder to intercept than a regular radio signal, it would still be possible to eavesdrop data (secret keys in our LIRA protocol)
transmitted using a flashing screen with collocated suitably sensitive photo-detectors (e.g., a regular camera and assumes a much stronger adversary who is capable of reading the contents of the flashing screen at any moment.
In this scheme, we use VLC channel in combination with a security primitive integrity codes (I-codes) [24] .
Unlike similar approaches in [25, 16] , where VLC is used for transmission of short authentication strings, in the present scheme VLC is used only as a means to synchronize specially crafted (I-coded) radio messages and to easy the process of loading the group size info into interface limited devices. Similar approaches based on I-codes appear in [26] (TEP protocol) and in [27] (Chorus protocol). However, TEP is a pairing protocol intended for two devices only, while Chorus require users to manually enter the group size into at least one legitimate device ‡ , which can be very demanding (error-prone) to accomplish on devices with limited user interfaces [16, 28] . On the contrary, our solutions utilizing a multitouch screen as the light source, scale well to hundreds of devices and make the problem of counting and informing the devices about the size of the initialization group rather trivial.
Finally, we also add to better understanding of security and robustness of I-code security primitive [24] , by studying its behavior in realistic (low and high interference) environments both analytically and through experiments.
Motivation to utilize touchscreens
Today, touchscreens are ubiquitous in our everyday lives be it on smartphones, tablets, laptopts, desktop monitors, different appliances, they can be found just everywhere.
As mentioned above, a common requirement by many group authentication protocols that support groups of an arbitrary size (two or more devices/entities) is that at least one device from that group knows the correct group size. To meet this requirement, many such protocols require users to manually enter the group size into at least one legitimate device. While this is easy to do on devices equipped with keypads, keyboards or verify on displays, it is especially challenging to carry out the same task on devices that have very constrained interfaces (e.g., have a single push-button and a LED) [16, 28] . Being omnipresent touchscreens are an excellent ‡ This is essential for the security of such protocols, since otherwise an unauthorized (malicious) device could easily join the group/network as a legitimate member. in the present work, we leave it as a potential future work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the symmetric key protocols, and the security analysis of these protocols is given in Section 3.
The public key based protocol and and its security analysis is given in Section 4. Usability evaluation and related work are provided in Section 5 and 6. Finally, we conclude in Section 7. to enable secure communication between a group G of interface limited wireless devices. We denote with G the size of the group, i.e., G = G , and we assume the devices from G to be trusted. At the onset of the bootstrapping process, the user designates one arbitrary device from G as a coordinator, represented by C. Depending on the setting, the coordinator can be a specialized device (e.g., serving the role of an internet proxy) or just an ordinary device (one among equals). To accomplish this task, the user simply places the intended coordinator device on the touchscreen, i.e., the light source unit (LS), as the first device from G, so that the screen can learn its position.
Alternatively, the user could place the intended coordinator device at the predefined spot on the screen, or simply circle it once all the devices from G have been placed on the screen. The application logic behind the role of the LIRA light source unit can be implemented as a standalone application or even better as a web application § .
The user then places the remaining devices from the group, represented by Si, i ∈ G, on the touchscreen and powers them on. Each device should be placed in such a way that it can measure the light intensity of the flashing fragment of the screen that corresponds to the device's location. Moreover, the device should completely block the light coming from the flashing part of the screen below it (later in Section 4 we relax this requirement). At the same time the touchscreen (LS unit) determines the position of each device placed on it and their total number, i.e., G. § Being a web application, the user would simply have to load a given web page, using https protocol, on his/her touchscreen device.
Following LIRA protocol shown in Fig. 2 , at this stage of the protocol the light source unit LS allocates a unique session identity IDi to each device i ∈ G. The coordinator C is allocated a special fixed identity, represented by a string IDC, which is known apriori to all the protocol entities; IDC is essentially a public and system-wide parameter. In LIRA, the coordinator C is always allocated the number 0 as its unique identity (IDC = 0), while the remaining devices are allocated sequentially increasing identities, starting with 1 and ending with G − 1. LS unit also generates a random k-bit master secret key K C to be used by the coordinator. After that, a pseudo-random function PRF (e.g., HMAC) is applied to the allocated IDs in order to derive secret keys for the remaining devices as follows:
Referring to Fig. 2 (the dashed arrows), at this stage LS sends simultaneously the following message flow {IDi, IDC, Ki}, over a private one-way visible light channel, to each device Si, i ∈ G {C}. At the same time, LS sends the message flow {IDC, G, K C } to the coordinator device. Upon the reception of its message flow, the device designated as a coordinator learns its role, the number of devices in the group (i.e., G), and the master secret key K C . Similarly, the remaining devices learn their own role, the unique identities allocated to them, and the derived secret keys Ki. Please note that the keys Ki derived from K C are computationally independent since the used PRF function has strong one-way property [6] .
Thus, even if one device Si (except the coordinator) is captured, the master secret key K C as well as other derived keys are safe; in Section 3 we provide a more detailed security analysis. The light source unit (LS) completes its task at this stage of LIRA protocol and it can safely delete/forget all the session keys and identities. The key generation process is shown in Fig. 13 given in Appendix.
Key verification over a radio channel
To verify the correct and authentic key reception in the previous stage, the network devices use a public radio channel. We use the second radio channel because the light channel used in LIRA only allows one-way communication (from LS to Si, i ∈ G Si, i ∈ G {C}; they can easily accomplish this later, by using the coordinator C as the common trusted party.
The key verification goes as follows. Referring to Fig. 2 (the solid arrows), the coordinator C generates a random n-bit nonce Ni and sends to the device Si the message flow {IDi, Ni}. Upon the reception of the message, Si generates a random n-bit nonce N Si , and sends back to The coordinator C repeats the above protocol with each device Si, i ∈ G {C}. After the correct key verification the green LED will be powered ON on all the devices from the group G (including the coordinator); for more details please refer to subsection 2.4. To successfully conclude the bootstrapping process, the user has to press a given button on all the devices, within a predefined time period (e.g., 10-20s), but only after having verified visually that LEDs on all the devices (including the coordinator) are ON; this is done in all-or-none fashion. In Section 3 we give a detailed security analysis of LIRA protocol.
Simplified LIRA protocol (LIRA+)
Here we show how to accomplish the same authentication goals as with the basic LIRA protocol, but with a smaller number of messages. We term this simplified version of LIRA protocol as LIRA+. LIRA+ is given in Fig. 3; the part of the protocol relating to the key generation and transmission over the visible light channel is the same as in the basic LIRA and hence not shown here.
Being a two-pass mutual authentication protocol, LIRA+ reduces overall number of messages by (G − 1) compared to the basic LIRA, G being the group size. Moreover,
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(ii) the device identities are unique in each session. In Section 3, we formally establish the security guarantees of LIRA+ protocol using Scyther tool ¶ .
Indicating a device status to the user
As the user needs to know if a bootstrapping process was successful for each network device, the current state of a device will be indicated with a LED according to the state diagram shown in Fig. 4 . There are four possible states that a device can occupy: Uninitialized, Ready, Initialized and Confirmed or Error.
Uninitialized state. When a device is first powered on it occupies the uninitialized state, which is indicated by the LED blinking once.
Ready state. After the initial blink the device will enter the ready state with the LED turned OFF, and it is ready to receive a session key through the light channel. The device will remain in this state indefinitely and will only proceed after it has received an appropriate synchronization/start message over the light channel. Following this message the device expects to receive a secret session key along with other parameters defined by LIRA protocol, over the same channel. ¶ http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/scyther/ Initialized state. Having received a secret key Ki over the light channel, the device enters the initialized state. In this state the green LED will blink continuously to indicate that the key verification process over a public radio channel is in progress.
Confirmed or Error state. If the key verification was successful, the device enters the confirmed state, indicated by the LED powered ON, awaiting the user to confirm the bootstrapping process by a push on the device button.
If the button is not pressed within a predefined time period (e.g., 10-20s) or the key verification phase was not successful, the device enters the error state indicated by the device LED blinking continuously with two times higher frequency than in the initialized state. In this case, the the device automatically resets itself and the user has to repeat the bootstrapping process with all the network devices; if needed the user can reset any device by a long push on the device button.
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF LIRA
In this section we provide a detailed security analysis of . In our analysis we used five honest entity runs; according to the author of Scyther [30] attacks such as replay or man-in-the-middle attacks are typically found within the bound of two or three runs for many protocol. Our choice to use Scyther tool for security analysis was motivated by the fact that LIRA protocol is based on adopted ISO/IEC 9798-4 three-pass mutual authentication protocol that was also analyzed with
Scyther by Basin et al. [31] .
In our security analysis we are interested whether the following authentication and secrecy properties are satisfied: secrecy of the session keys K C and Ki, i ∈ G {C}, and injective agreement. In [32] Lowe provided a hierarchy of authentication specifications, with injective agreement being the strongest one. Verification of LIRA. Scyther validates that the model of LIRA protocol (given in Appendix) that involve less than six honest device runs satisfies injective agreement and preserves secrecy of the session key Ki. Please note that in Scyther, the injective agreement property is satisfied only if both non-injective agreement and non-injective synchronization hold [32] . Furthermore, the bound on the number of honest device runs is not a limiting factor in our analysis since all the keys and random nonces in LIRA are assumed to be of sufficient length (e.g., 128 bits), so that a polynomially bounded attacker can gain only a negligible advantage by observing more protocol runs. with a fresh session key (see Fig. 3 ). Therefore, for this attack to work the given pair of devices should
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PUBLIC KEY BASED DEPLOYMENT SOLUTION
In this section we extend the attacker model to a more powerful adversary who can also observe the electromagnetic radiation from the screen and/or from the cable that connects the video card with the screen [23] . By observing these emanations the attacker can easily extract all secret keys Ki deployed to devices.
To counter such adversaries, we explore the possibility of using the family of protocols that enable mutual authentication of public keys exchanged by the devices over an insecure radio channel that result in a public authentication value/string [33] , [16] , [34] . More specifically, our proposed public key-based solution is based on I-codes, a physical layer primitive for authenticated string comparison over the insecure wireless channel [24] . To better understand the security and robustness of the proposed solution, we also study in detail the behavior of I-codes in realistic (low and high interference) environments both analytically and through extensive experiments.
The main motivation to use I-codes for transmission of public messages rather than using approaches in which users verify public messages communicated via VLC [25] , [16] is to design a solution that minimizes participation by non-specialist users.
Description of the public key deployment scheme
The proposed public key deployment scheme is shown in It is essential for security of any group device pairing protocol from this category of protocols that at least one uncompromised device knows the exact number of devices involved in the initialization [16] , [28] . If this condition is not met the attacker could easily add its own device to the group. Although some solutions propose users to enter the group size into every device, the problem cannot be easily addressed, especially in scenarios where devices lack user interfaces (such as screen, keyboards, keypads...).
For this reason in our solution the touchscreen transmits information about the group size using VLC to each group device.
Having received information about the group size from the screen, the devices begin with Group Authentication Protocol over a radio channel (Fig. 5 ). During this phase the coordinator C initiates the execution of an authentication protocol such as GAP [16] or SAS [35, 33] to exchange public keys with the devices Si. The protocol results in a public authentication value/string, such as a hash of public keys [36] , a short authentication string (SAS) [35, 33] or a group authentication string (GAS) [16] ( Fig. 5) .
To ensure the integrity of the resulting public authentication value/string, in our key deployment scheme we use VLC in combination with a security primitive integrity codes (I-codes) [24] . The key characteristics of I-codes are: unidirectional message coding, on-off keying modulation and receiver's awareness of presence in the sender's transmission range. Unidirectional error detecting codes are able to detect any number of unidirectional errors in a given code word; for example, it is possible to change a bit "0" into a bit "1" but the contrary is not possible.
In I-codes, on-off keying modulation is achieved such that the bit "1" is transmitted on the channel as the presence of a radio signal and the bit "0" is transmitted as the absence of signal. This modulation scheme along with unidirectional message coding enables authenticated string comparison over insecure radio channels given that the adversary cannot annihilate/cancel the radio signal (bit "1") -so called "anti-blocking property" [24] . In original I-codes all devices are synchronized with respect to the SYN message sent over the radio channel by the coordinator C [24] , whereas, in our implementation a touchscreen uses a VLC channel to transmit the SYN message to the devices. The purpose of the SYN message is to make devices aware that the transmission of the I-coded authentication string over a radio channel has started.
As shown in Fig. 5 the beginning of the public authentication string transmission starts with a synchronization message (SYN) sent over VLC. This synchronization signal is sent by the light source LS to all the devices. After the coordinator C and the devices Si read the SYN.START message, the coordinator C starts to broadcast the group authentication string (GAS) over the radio channel using the I-codes. The coordinator C first encodes the group authentication string (a binary vector of size ) using
Manchester coding (0 → 01 and 1 → 10) and obtains a vector of size 2 ⋅ bits. After that, every bit is sent over a radio channel using on-off keying (i.e., bit "1": short packet with holds the authenticated public keys from all other group devices. To inform the user that the device initialization process was successful a green LED is powered ON.
When the green LED powers ON on all group devices the initialization process is finished.
Security of VLC channel in a stronger attacker model
In this section we extend the attacker model to a more powerful adversary who can inject its own light signals in the VLC channel between the screen and the group device. Here we consider a scenario in which an attacker can inject a light beam almost parallel to the screen (e.g., adversary flips the first symbol 0 → 1. This will result in the codeword 110110. However, such a codeword cannot be demodulated, because there is no transformation for the pair 11; it will simply be ignored by the receiver.
Signal cancellation attack in realistic environments
In this section we explore the possibility of the the attacker to cancel out the public value/string coded with security primitive I-codes by flipping at least one symbol "1" of the string into symbol "0". Due to the on-off keying modulation of I-codes this would imply that the adversary has to annihilate at least one signal (waveform) emitted on the channel [24] . In this section we perform a detailed analysis of the attacker's capabilities to cancel out the original I-codes signal using antenna cancellation model presented by Choi et. al. [37] . Since we study signal cancellation attacks in realistic environments, we give a more detailed analysis of I-codes in realistic environment, both analytically and through experiments.
This form of attack is shown by Pöpper et. al. [38] and it is based on signal annihilation when the attacker successfully sends an inverse signal to the receiver. The attacker does not generate its own signal, but instead utilizes a pair of directional antennas to annihilate the sender's signal at the receiver end, as shown by an example in Fig. 6 . Inspired by this work Hou et. al. [27] proposed the solution with frequency hopping to achieve arbitrarily small probability of signal cancellation.
T. K. et al. In this paper we show that in realistic environment
conditions it is quite difficult for the the attacker to annihilate the signal. More specifically, we assume that the attacker does not know the exact distance between the antennas of two devices (d AB in Fig. 6 ), nor the exact amplitude of the baseband signal at the receiver's end.
More specifically, we show that even a small distance mismatch (e.g., 3mm), and/or small amplitude mismatch (e.g., 10 %) the signal cancellation will fail. Since wireless transmission uses a band of frequencies, we also study the impact of signal bandwidth on signal cancellation. We will now study how the mismatch in the amplitude and the phase affect the attacker's ability to cancel the radio signal at the receiver. As shown in Fig. 6 Alice modulates the signal baseband from the x(t) and sends it to Bob, sa(t) = A0x(t)e j2πf 0 t . This signal is attenuated and phase shifted in the wireless channel and hence received by Bob as s b (t) = Ax(t)e j2πf 0 t , where A and f0 are the amplitude and center frequency of the received original signal, respectively. Due to simplicity of calculation and without any loss of generality, we assume that there is no phase shift between signals sa and s b .
The attacker Eve, using two directional antennas, relays the signal sa(t) to Bob. This signal is received by Bob as a b (t) = Bx(t)e j2πf 0 t+θ , where B, θ, and f0 are the amplitude, the phase shift and the center frequency of the signal relayed by the attacker, respectively. Bob receives the following composite signal:
Let us express the attacker's signal amplitude as B = A + ∆A, where ∆A represents the amplitude mismatch between the original and the attacker's signals at Bob. Please note that here we ignore the noise effect thus making the job easier for the attacker. The instantaneous power of the received signal is [39] : where r(t) is the complex conjugate of the signal r(t)
received by Bob, x(t) is the absolute value of the baseband signal x(t).
From Eq. 2 we can see that the attacker will successfully cancel out the original signal s b (t) if the amplitude mismatch between the direct signal and the relay signal is ∆A = 0, and the phase shift θ is multiple of π. 19.9 dB for 0 mm distance mismatch and 10% amplitude mismatch using signal with bandwidth of 2 MHz. In other words, even in such very advantageous scenarios for the adversary he will not be able to sufficiently attenuate the radio signal at the receiver's end. This, and the fact that it is very likely the attacker will not know the exact distance between himself and the group devices, nor the originating signal's power at the receiver end, we can conclude that in realistic conditions the probability to cancel the signal at the receiver is negligible. We can note that all these considerations were taken under very advantageous assumptions for the attacker: no multipath fading effects, no noise in the radio channel, complete knowledge of directivity and gains of antennas. Also the attacker must be located close to the direct channel and act very quickly in order to cancel the signal by using two coupled directional antennas. Longer distances would require additional amplification of the signal relayed by the attacker, implying the usage of active electronic devices which affects the signal spectrum and also complicates the signal cancellation. In conclusion, under the assumption of our system model, the energy of the radio signal cannot be annihilated by an adversary at the receiver and thus radio signal anti-blocking property can be safely assumed in our solution.
Performance of public key deployment in high interference environment
An important practical consideration that has not been explored yet is the performance of I-codes in conditions of non-malicious interference from other wireless devices operating within our frequency spectrum. Capkun et al. [24] performed a robustness analysis of I-codes which shows the message transmission success ratio as a function of the size of transmitted messages. Hou et al. [27] considers non-malicious interference from other nearby Results of experimental analysis. In the first scenario we studied the impact of low interference from other signals on our I-codes implementation. Besides our radio signal at 2.448 GHz (WiFi channel 7) there were signals from 3 WiFi networks that operated on channels 6, 9, and 11. In our experiments we used 2 nRF24L01+ devices that were placed on the screen. Recall, the screen is used to synchronize the transmission of I-codes encoded messages using VLC channel. One device acted as a source of I-coded messages and the other one as the destination. The source generated and transmitted messages of varying size (from 4 bits to 160 bits). The source repeatedly transmitted each message 1000 times. Fig. 8(a) shows the message transmission success rate ps (obtained as the ratio between the number of correctly received messages and the number of total transmitted messages).
After that we performed the experiments in a highinterference scenario. To accomplish high interference environment, in addition to our radio signal at 2.448 GHz, there were signals from 6 Wi-Fi networks that operated on channels 5, 6, 9 (two networks) and 11. We placed in the vicinity of our devices (about 3 meters away) an access point that operated on channel 7 (2.442 GHz) and continuously transmitted packets. To increase the effect of interference we also exchanged a large amount of data using the Bluetooth communication between the two Bluetooth devices placed 2 meters from our devices. In this example we used a group of 4 devices that were placed on the screen to synchronize the transmission process by visible light (Section 4). One device transmitted messages of varying size encoded using I-codes, each message was repeated 2000 times. In this case we measured the message transmission success ratio ps for each of the three remaining devices. In Fig. 8(a) we show the results for the device that is most affected by interference, as well as the total success ratio for all three receiving devices.
In Fig. 8 This means that overall 960 ms (160 bits×2 ms×3 retransmissions) is required to successfully transmit a 160 bit long message. However, under conditions of high interference there is a small chance to successfully transfer a 160 bit message without dividing it into fragments, as can be seen in Fig. 8 
(c).
Our goal is to find an optimum (minimum) number of fragments n for successful transmission of the complete message m with high probability within the shortest period of time (i.e., the smallest number of repetitions N ). The probability that a message is still incomplete after N (re)transmissions is:
Please note here that we assume all fragment success/loss events to be mutually independent. Then we can calculate the expected total number of (re)transmissions to successfully transfer the complete message:
After applying the derivative for geometric series we obtain: the transmission success ratio ps significantly decreases, resulting in a significant increase in the expected time required to successfully transmit a message. From Fig. 9 we also see that the optimal fragment size is 20 bits and 
Discussion
One significant implication of the synchronization based on the visible light channel as well as the transmission of the fragment number over the radio channel is that receivers do not have to know in advance the length of the message to be transmitted over the radio channel.
Moreover, if one of the receivers does not correctly receive kth message fragment in ith transmission, it is only sufficient to be correctly received in jth transmission (j > i). Consideration conducted in this paper show that our implementation of I-codes is suitable for the transmission of short authentication strings even under the conditions of high (non-malicious) interference. It is also shown that our solution is suitable for the transmission of long authentication messages (e.g. 160 bit message digests) over the radio channel under these conditions.
USABILITY EVALUATION
We carried out experiments to study different usability aspects of our solution. We wanted to test the hypothesis that our solution is practical, easy to use, and user-friendly for an end user. We also wanted test the hypothesis that our solution is faster than the initialization of the wireless devices via a cable, and that it scales well with the number of devices to be initialized. Although our usability evaluation is conducted for the symmetrickey cryptography-based protocol (LIRA), the results and conclusions obtained from these tests are applicable to our public-key based solution too. This is true because: (i) from the user point of view nothing changes -the user takes the devices, places them on the screen and pushes a button to start the deployment, (ii) the time required for initialization of the network is almost the same for both protocols.
Testbed implementation details
We next describe a testbed used in the usability evaluation of our secret-key based protocol (LIRA). The coordinator C and the devices Si in our solution were implemented on commercially available Arduino Uno platform based on: ATmega328, 32 KB flash memory, 2 KB SRAM, 1 KB EEPROM and 16 MHz clock speed. We also used ZigBee radio (Xbee S2 module), BPW34 photodiodes and green LEDs. In our experiments we emulated a multitouchscreen using regular 22-inch LCD screen placed horizontally. The exact position of the devices Si as well as their number is detected using a camera located above the screen and connected to the PC running an OpenCV (Fig. 10) ; OpenCV recognizes device Si by detecting yellow markers attached to them.
We developed an application for the PC that controls At the reception side, device (a photodiode) samples light levels with a every 10 milliseconds. Since the transmission of every bit lasts for 50 milliseconds this means that device will take 5 samples for each bit. We set a threshold level such that the signal/trace received above that level is converted into a binary "1" or, alternatively into a "0". Next, a convolution function is applied over the received/sampled series of "zeros" and "ones" using the delimiter with mask {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}.
As a result of convolving signal with this mask, we obtain a data array with values ranging from 0 to 5, Please note that the time required to deploy keys from PC to devices over a light channel is fixed and independent on the number of nodes since the screen simultaneously (in parallel) deploys the keys to each device.
Test cases and test procedure
We conducted two usability studies: LIRA only and LIRA vs. Cable study. In the first usability study we tested the hypothesis that users perceive the proposed LIRA solution user-friendly and achieve small error rates during the initialization process. A total number of 48 users took part in the usability study: 22 in the LIRA study and 26 in LIRA vs. Cable study. All participants were volunteers who were asked to help in our research, and none of them was economically motivated to achieve results that are biased towards the positive results of our usability study. They were mainly university students (computer science or electronics), 5 of them had PhD and 2 MSc. For each participant in the study, we logged the overall protocol completion time, as well as the error rate. The completion time included the device manipulative cost (e.g., powering ON the device, placing it on the touch-screen) as well as the total time for key exchange and authentication. The key deployment procedure for each tester was recorded by a camera and the overall times were subsequently extracted from the video. Although our university does not require the ethical review board to review and approve research work with the human testers, all the testers in our study were informed in advance how the collected data of their study will be recorded and processed after the evaluation.
Before proceeding to each test, all the users were briefly introduced to the concept of device pairing. This was followed by the practical demonstration from the administrator and a short video of the procedure itself. The training procedure lasted for about 5 minutes. After that, the users tested the method. At the end of the usability test, the users completed a post-test questionnaire. The System Usability Scale (SUS) [40] test was used to numerically express the users' satisfaction with the system. The System Usability Scale (SUS) is a ten-item (Likert) scale giving a global view of subjective assessments of usability [40] .
In addition, the users were also asked for their opinion about the usability and perceived security of the proposed schemes.
LIRA study
LIRA study was conducted with a total number of 22 participants. Our goal was to verify that the users perceive the proposed LIRA solution user-friendly and can detect errors during the initialization process. An error was indicated by a continuously blinking LED on the device (Fig. 4) . To accomplish this the user's task was to initialize a group of 3, 6 and 9 wireless devices. Each tester performed tests 3 times with each group of wireless devices, leading to a total number of 198 test cases (3 × 22 × 3 = 198). In Appendix (Fig. 12) we show an initialization procedure involving 9 devices.
At the beginning of the test, the user powers on the devices and places them on the touchscreen (Fig. 1) . Next, the user starts the initialization process (LIRA protocol) and waits for the end of the process which is signaled by were able to identify the error that was indicated by a continuously blinking LED on a randomly selected device. Usability. Fig. 11(b) shows the SUS score for LIRA solution provided by the users. The average SUS score was 89.77 (out of 100) which makes the solution highly usable [40] . In addition to SUS questionnaire the average user's overall satisfaction rate of the system's features was 4.82 (in a 5-point Likert scale), as can be seen in Fig. 11(c) .
LIRA vs. Cable study
A total number of 26 participants took part in LIRA vs. Fig. 11(b) . In addition we rated the overall user's satisfaction to using LIRA and Cable solutions (in a 5-point Likert scale). The average user's satisfaction rate was 4.62 for LIRA solution and 3.69 for Cable solution, as shown in Fig. 11 were not significantly different.
Other observations
According to the results of the post-test questionnaires in the LIRA vs. Cable study 22 users (85%) prefer our LIRA solution over Cable solution. However, a couple of users did not feel comfortable knowing that part of the key deployment protocol occurs over the radio channel. This is mostly because users know that "...communication can be recorded while traveling over the radio". Some users also suggested implementing a red blinking LED as an error signalization instead of a green blinking LED to increase the rate of detecting potential errors.
Initialization of even larger group of devices
Recall, in our tests we used up to 9 prototype-based devices mostly because of their size as well as the screen size.
To be more precise, we used a 22-inch size screen and nine 15 × 7 cm (5.9 × 2.75 inch) devices. Please note that the number of such devices can be even larger if we take into account that the dimensions of devices may be several times smaller than the ones used in our tests (iBeacons [3] ). In addition, our solution allows the initialization of a reasonably larger number of devices (e.g. more than 100). One approach to accomplishing this task would include dividing the devices into smaller groups (e.g. up to 10-20 devices) that can fit the screen size, and initialize every group separately in batches. It is important to note that a single coordinator device (the device that was initially assigned to this role) must be present during the initialization of every group in order to preserve the coexistence of the whole initialization solution. Please note that such approach slightly deteriorates usability since user is now required to repeat the initialization in several batches.
RELATED WORK
Many different key deployment schemes such as SPINS [6] , LEAP [41] , TinySec architecture [42] , and schemes [7, 8, 43, 44] have been suggested in the last couple of years. All of these schemes assume that each node already possesses one or more initial secret keys which is not a reasonable assumption for many applications because an attacker can discover the keys during their deployment.
Shake Them Up [45] , Smart-Its Friends [46] , and Are You with Me [47] are schemes that use movement to establish a secret key and thus require an accelerometer on each sensor node to measure movement. Resurrecting Duckling [48, 49] uses physical contact to set up a secure shared key, however this scheme requires a specialized hardware interface for physical contact. Similarly to the above schemes, Message-In-a-Bottle (MIB) [10] and KALwEN [11] are key management schemes that need additional equipment as a smart faraday cage.
Talking to Strangers [50] , Seeing-is-Believing (SiB) [36] , MANA I, II, and III [51] , Short Authenticated Strings (SAS) [52] and [33] based protocols, MANA IV [53] , and schemes proposed by Gehrmann et al. [51] , and Wong and Stajano [54] , [12] utilize an OOB channel to setup public keys. The main drawback of these solutions is the number of the exchanged messages over an OoB channel or an insecure wireless channel.
I-codes [35] , [24] exploit physical properties of radio channel and consists of three main parts: on-off keying modulation, signal anti-blocking which means that the energy of signal cannot be annihilated by an adversary, and I-coding. Based on I-codes Gollakota et al. in [26] propose Tamper [27] propose Chorus as a scalable in-band trust establishment for multiple constrained devices over the insecure wireless channel. Hou et al. refer to the work of Pöper [38] in which a correlated signal cancellation attack is shown to be practical. However this is a very strong assumption and we are in our work showed through a detailed analysis how it is difficult and almost impossible for an attacker to cancel signal at the receiver in realistic conditions.
Wong and Stajano propose Multichannel Group Device
Pairing Protocol (MC-GDP) [34] in which each device has to be capable of demodulating signals received over an OoB channel. In HAPADEP [55] both data and verification information are sent over an audio channel and thus the pairing devices have to be equipped with speakers and microphones. Saxena and Udin in [13] , [14] , and Saxena et al. in [15] and Perkovic et al. in [25] in WBANs and presented in [56] , [57] , [58] . The main drawback of these solutions is that they are applicable only to sensors that measure the same physiological signals and thus applicable only in WBANs. Shi et al. in [59] propose ASK-BAN, a lightweight fast authenticated secret key extraction scheme for intra-BAN communication. This scheme has a very low key generation rate compared with the other solutions.
CONCLUSION
In this work we designed and implemented two key In the second scheme we extended the attacker model to an extremely strong adversary who can observe the electromagnetic radiation from the screen and from the connecting cable between the screen and the video card.
This scheme uses public-key cryptography and I-codes, a physical layer security primitive, for which transmission is synchronized by SYN signals over the visible light channel. We showed through detailed analysis that this construction is highly secure even when facing a very strong attacker who has a full control of the radio channel and to a great extent of the VLC channel too. We also showed through experiments and analytically that our public-key scheme is resistant to high non-malicious interference from other signals in the same part of the radio spectrum.
In the future, we will plan to work on more efficient coding techniques for the VLC channel. Likewise we will look at extending our solutions to enable efficient authentication and authorization of devices over public networks such as public telecom networks and Internet. Figure 13 . Key generation procedure, its transmission over the Visible Light Channel, and decoding at the reception side.
